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Abstract – Ad hoc m-commerce is an emerging way of 
conducting online trading wirelessly within dynamic network 
communities. However, participants in such systems are 
vulnerable to attacks on identity establishment such as 
spoofing and whitewashing as part of fraudulent and unfair 
trading practices. This paper presents a scheme for identity 
support using PGP certificates in a fully self-organised 
manner, where a trading pseudonym and photograph are used 
as identity credentials. It lets participating parties collaborate 
in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) way to establish their online identity in 
a manner that is resistant to such attacks without any 
mediation of a Certification Authority (CA). It also lets 
participating parties handle the security settings of the trading 
system as well as share knowledge about fellow participants’ 
trading behaviour without relying on support from a network 
service provider. 
Keywords – casual local trading, collaborative service, ad 
hoc community, infrastructure-less service, PGP 
I. INTRODUCTION  
An ad hoc m-commerce trading system is a type of 
casual local trading facility conducted online and wirelessly 
outside established computer networks. It enables mobile 
users to organise themselves into a trading forum regardless 
of time or location without relying on any infrastructure 
support from a network service provider [1]. Members of a 
trading forum will utilize available computing resources to 
communicate and participate in activities such as m-
commerce transactions, membership management, 
attestation processes and so on. However, since such 
activities are carried out over ad hoc wireless networks and 
as no network service provider can be relied upon to provide 
security services, this type of trading system is vulnerable to 
various types of attacks that undermine its functionality and 
dependability. These include identity spoofing, Sybil 
attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, unfair evaluations, 
collusions and misleading trade descriptions.  
Public key cryptography provides a variety of techniques 
for online identification, which can be used to protect 
traders against attempts to misrepresent identity. Such 
identity support can be used as part of a security and trust 
service to protect the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality 
and non-repudiation of information being exchanged, as 
well as to establish a tight binding between a trader’s 
identity and its reputation and membership information.  
The identity-reputation binding enables traders to assess the 
trustworthiness of other traders. The identity-membership 
information binding helps traders to determine the validity 
of each member’s membership voucher and also each vote 
made by participating parties in collaborative decision 
making processes for membership management. In ad hoc 
m-commerce trading systems, a membership service could 
keep track of a trading forum’s membership and help 
determine the current membership status of each participant. 
It would consist of mechanisms for traders to join, to verify 
other parties’ membership and to exclude those that do not 
adhere to the trading forum’s norms. Our scheme proposes 
that to be recognised as a member of a trading forum, a 
trader must possess a valid membership voucher that has a 
sufficient number of votes from recognised members of the 
forum, is digitally signed by a recognised member that 
issues it and its validity period must not have expired [2].  
However, ad hoc m-commerce trading systems lack 
infrastructure services to support public key cryptographic 
mechanisms that rely on a trusted CA. They also cannot 
support self-organised substitutes that require one or more 
parties to be the certification authority for other peers as 
participation by those parties on a regular basis cannot be 
guaranteed in such a dynamic trading community. Identity 
establishment in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems 
requires a scheme that is peer to peer, independent of a pre-
established network infrastructure and able to support 
infrequent communications among traders.  This paper 
presents such a scheme for identity support for a security 
and trust service. It lets traders in an ad hoc m-commerce 
trading system establish their own online identity using 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) technology that uses a trading 
pseudonym and photograph as identity credentials in PGP 
certificates and supports a self-revocation mechanism. It 
also lets the traders collaborate in a P2P manner to handle 
the attestation process of those identities as well as to 
control other security elements of the trading system. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
discusses possible security threats and attacks on ad hoc m-
commerce and their impact on trading systems.  Section III 
describes the essential elements in security and trust 
services for such systems.  Section IV discusses the notion 
of online identity. Section V critically assesses related work. 
Section VI presents our approach for identity establishment 
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in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems. Section VII 
concludes the paper. 
II. POSSIBLE THREATS AND ATTACKS  
There are several possible threats and attacks that can 
subvert the security of an ad hoc m-commerce trading 
system. We only focus on addressing the most common 
ones that significantly impact the functionality and 
dependability of such systems. We identify those threats and 
attacks and classify them into three categories: 
A. Identity-related issues 
Traders in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems are 
represented by their online identity, which we propose to 
handle with trading pseudonyms. Using pseudonyms to 
participate in online transactions in such a loose ad hoc 
community exposes them to the following security attacks. 
1) Identity spoofing (masquerade)  
Identity spoofing is where a party tries to pass himself 
off as someone else. The prime risk is that he may use that 
spoofed identity to defraud others. 
2) Sybil Attacks 
Sybil attack is where a party creates multiple identities 
to cheat collective decision making processes to subvert the 
trading system. 
3) Whitewashing 
A whitewasher is a party who leaves a particular forum 
and then re-enters with a new identity to hide his bad 
reputation. 
B. Information-related issues 
As exchanges of information in ad hoc m-commerce 
trading systems are conducted solely over insecure ad hoc 
wireless networks and may involve intermediaries, 
participants in such trading systems are vulnerable to man-
in-the-middle attacks. Such an attack occurs when a party 
intercepts communications between two other parties and 
then tampers with or omits messages being transferred 
without the knowledge of either sender or recipient. 
C. Misbehaviour-related issues 
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, it is to be 
expected that traders will often engage in transactions with 
unfamiliar parties. This will make them susceptible to 
subversive behaviour by their trading counterparties such as: 
1) Trade Misdescriptions 
A party may cheat other traders by offering fake items as 
real or by trading items that are not as described in the offer. 
2) Unfair Deal Evaluations 
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, traders could be 
required to evaluate each other after the completion of each 
transaction by means of deal evaluations. They could be 
used to assess each trader’s reputation and could consist of 
at least the following information. 
a) The evaluator’s trading pseudonym. 
b) Transaction contract which is digitally signed by 
both parties and has a timestamp as a proof of a transaction. 
c) Evaluation result that records the amount of 
satisfaction the evaluator receives from the trade. 
d) The evaluator’s digital signature. 
If a transaction concludes positively, traders could be 
required to express their satisfaction in the deal evaluation, 
digitally sign it and then send it to their trading counterpart. 
Otherwise, they could share their bad evaluation with other 
traders in the trading forum. However, an ill-intentioned 
trader might manipulate the reputation of other traders by 
giving unfair deal evaluations. There are at least two types 
of unfair evaluations; overstatements and slanders. 
Overstatements give inaccurate positive evaluations to 
increase the reputation of a particular party while slanders 
attack the reputation of trading counterparties by giving 
inaccurate negative evaluations to lower their reputation. 
3) Repudiation Misbehaviour 
Repudiation misbehaviour occurs when a trader 
performs a particular action and then denies having 
performed it. There are at least two significant types of such 
misbehaviour; data and contract repudiations. Data 
repudiation occurs when a trader sends a message or 
document and then denies having sent it. Contract 
repudiation occurs when one party initiates a transaction or 
agrees on a transaction contract and then denies having 
initiated the transaction or having made the contract.  
4) Collusions 
Collusion is where multiple parties or a party with 
multiple identities conspire to influence their own or other 
traders’ reputation, group decision making processes, 
attestation processes and so on.  
The significant impact that these attacks have on the 
security of the trading systems is that they can undermine 
the reliability of the following: 
a) The reputation service, e.g. a trader may conspire 
with associates to influence his own or other traders’ 
reputations by providing unfair deal evaluations, which lead 
other traders into making incorrect trust decisions that result 
in unsatisfactory transactions. 
b) Group membership management, e.g. multiple 
traders may collude to subvert collaborative decision 
making for group membership management or an 
intermediary may discard or alter a vote that is sent via his 
node without being detected by the end parties 
c) Attestation processes, e.g. a trader may create 
multiple identities to provide bogus support for certificates. 
d) Transaction activities, e.g. a trader may undertake a 
contract and then deny having made it. 
III. SECURITY AND TRUST SERVICE  
To create a sufficiently secure and trusted environment 
for traders to trade within ad hoc m-commerce trading 
systems, its security and trust service needs support for: 
A. Identity  
Identity support is probably the most crucial element in 
a security and trust service for an ad hoc m-commerce 
trading system. Robust means of identification will not only 
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protect traders from attacks aimed at identity disguise, but 
also lets other elements of a security and trust service 
function properly and effectively.  It provides a kind of 
security assurance for traders to communicate, collaborate, 
carry out transactions, manage membership and establish 
trust relationships with known other parties. 
B. Message authenticity,  integrity, confidentiality and 
non-repudiation 
Support for message authenticity, integrity and non-
repudiation is important to give assurance to participating 
parties that messages or documents being exchanged among 
them originated with their specified sender and were not 
altered in transit. Also, the recipients can be assured that the 
sender cannot credibly deny having sent them. 
Confidentiality will ensure that they are unreadable by 
eavesdroppers or intermediaries. Having these elements in 
the security and trust service will protect traders from man-
in-the-middle attacks and repudiation misbehaviour. 
C. Trust  
The development of trust relationships among traders is 
vital to mitigate uncertainty and risks involved in the 
transactions. Parkhe in [4], describes uncertainty in online 
transactions as uncertainty about future transactions and 
about potential trading partners’ behaviour in fulfilling their 
transaction agreements. These uncertainties create a 
perception of significant risk that might discourage traders 
from trading.  A trust relationship established between two 
traders lets them believe that their counterpart is a 
sufficiently reliable and honest party to trade with and that 
the downside risks are low enough for them to expose 
themselves to. Thus, by having support for trust in the 
security and trust service, security issues related to potential 
misbehaviour can be mitigated.  
D. Attestation 
Attestation is significant as it provides a means for 
traders to vouch for other parties’ credentials such as their 
digital certificates, membership status and reputation 
reports. It also helps to mitigate transaction risks, especially 
in situations that involve dealing with unfamiliar traders. 
IV. THE NOTION OF ONLINE IDENTITY 
In online trading, traders are represented by online 
identities. An online identity refers to a social identity that is 
established by users as a means to represent themselves in 
online communities. The main choice here seems to be 
between using their real identities such as their legal name, 
date of birth and home address or a trading pseudonym to 
represent themselves online. The use of a trading 
pseudonym would enable traders to participate in online 
trading incognito. It would also allow traders to keep their 
trading behaviour to a certain degree private. Furthermore, it 
would enable traders to project a distinctive trading persona 
that reinforces a reputation they wish to maintain. The real 
identity of a trader in terms of their legal name, date of birth 
and home address is not normally a relevant issue in online 
trading. The reputation of a trading pseudonym can be 
compromised just as easily as the reputation associated with 
a real identity. So the value of maintaining that reputation 
can act as a strong disincentive to abusing a trading 
pseudonym. By linking together reputation to a trader’s 
pseudonym, the trustworthiness as well as future behaviour 
of that trader can be evaluated and predicted as long as a 
persistent identity is used. Pseudonyms make things harder 
where parties seek legal redress against criminal trading 
practices or contract violations. However, in casual local 
trading such recourses to law are rare and anyway the 
problem of converting a trading pseudonym to the real 
identity behind it needed in legal cases is not insuperable. 
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, using real 
identities would create a problem of verification as no CA 
can be relied upon to have checked a trader’s real identity 
credentials such as his identity card or passport to verify his 
identity. Attestors of such identities would have to assure 
themselves that a trader was entitled to call himself by his 
purported legal name, was actually born on the stipulated 
date and genuinely resided at the stated address which is 
hard for other traders to be sure of. However, in practice 
casual trading attestors want to attest an identity established 
by a recognised appearance and a recognised form of 
address for trading purposes. What the subjects are really 
called or when they were born or where they really live is 
beside the point. Also, using real identities can make it 
harder for traders to maintain secrecy about their engaging 
in particular transactions. Lack of secrecy can threaten a 
trader’s privacy, put them at risk of harm from hostile 
competitors or even compromise the profitability of deals 
that they undertake. However, allowing pseudonyms raises 
the issue of whether it allows traders to create multiple 
identities or change their presented identity too easily. 
Traders might also try to hide their relation to a particular 
action like an attestation or vote and thus avoid being held 
accountable for that action. To prevent these issues in ad 
hoc m-commerce trading systems requires robust 
identification of traders. We propose doing this with digital 
certificates in a manner to be described in Section VI. 
V. RELATED WORK 
A significant amount of research has been done in the 
area of public key management in ad hoc wireless networks 
and several solutions have been proposed in the literature 
[5-18]. This section will discuss briefly those which are 
relevant to our work. Rahman [11] has proposed using the 
PGP Trust Model to let users generate their own asymmetric 
key pairs as well as to function as independent CAs. Thus, 
any user in the network can sign and verify any other user’s 
public key. These signatures progressively form a set of 
interconnected links of individual public keys or “Web of 
Trust” [9, 10]. The main interest in this approach is that it 
does not require a communal certification authority to vouch 
for a user’s public key. However, Rahman’s scheme 
requires a central key server to maintain a database of public 
keys which makes his approach unsuitable for ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems as the responsibility for hosting 
the key server will be problematic in such a loose trading 
community. It will be difficult or impossible to resolve who 
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would be responsible for providing and paying for the server 
and also whether all users would trust them to do that. 
Furthermore, uninterrupted connectivity with such a key 
server could not be guaranteed in such a network.  
Capkun et al. [12] have proposed a fully self-organized 
approach to public key management that does not rely on 
any trusted authority or centralized infrastructure. It lets 
users generate their own public key pairs, issue digital 
certificates to others and authenticate each other by merging 
their local certificate repositories and then evaluate the 
authenticity of a public key based on the certificates 
available in the merged repository. Interesting aspects of 
this approach are that it enables users to distribute control of 
the security settings of the system and also to perform key 
authentication based on the available information in each 
user’s local repository. It also does not require participation 
by all users during the authentication process. This approach 
seems to be suitable for our work due to its self-organised 
characteristic. However, its certificate renewal mechanism 
requires the same issuer to update a user’s certificate and 
would not be appropriate in our work as regular 
participation by trading parties cannot be guaranteed. 
Traders with expired certificates would be at serious risk of 
having to wait for a long time to get in contact with their 
certificate issuer or never succeed if the issuer is no longer 
active or has been excluded from the trading forum. 
Another fully self-organised approach has been 
described by Rachedi and Benslimane [13]. In their 
approach, they propose a distributed clustering algorithm to 
select a cluster head in each cluster, which is based on a 
trust value and mobility metric. The cluster head then 
becomes the CA in its cluster. The status of a CA node will 
change if other nodes do not receive any beacon from its 
node for a pre-defined period of time and a new CA will be 
elected. This approach does not seem to be workable either 
in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems as frequent changes 
in the CA role will make the attestation process unreliable. 
Furthermore, the role of a cluster head does not seem to be 
appropriate in a community of equals. Also, it cannot be 
expected that any prospective cluster head will be 
sufficiently trusted by all other traders in that cluster. While 
some parties will be trusted more than others by their fellow 
traders, many trading communities lack any prospect of 
achieving a consensus about which parties among them are 
worthy of enhanced trust. 
VI. OUR APPROACH 
The motivation for our approach comes from 
acknowledging the self-organizing and infrastructure-less 
nature of ad hoc wireless networks and allowing participants 
in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems to control their 
security settings. Support for identity establishment will 
include generating public and private key pairs, generating, 
signing and verifying PGP certificates as well as revoking 
compromised certificates. The verification process will be 
done in a P2P manner without the intervention of a CA. All 
participants will play a similar role. We assume that:  
a) Each trader maintains their own local certificate 
repository that contains their and other traders’ certificates 
that they have attested or acquired. 
b) Each trader creates their own trading pseudonym. 
To minimise the risk of more than one trader using the same 
pseudonym, traders are expected to check for this possibility 
against all trading pseudonyms that they have heard of. 
c) Traders verify other traders’ certificates based on 
their knowledge and recommendations from their trusted 
peers as detailed later in this section. 
d) The trading software that is jointly used by traders 
to carry out transactions comes from a trustworthy source. 
A. The creation of public/private key pairs 
Using PGP technology [9, 10], each trader will create 
their own private-public key pairs locally. 
B. The generation of digital certificates 
Traders will also generate their own self-signed digital 
certificates locally. The format of the certificates will be in 
the form of PGP certificates. Each certificate will contain at 
least the following information:- 
1) The certificate holder’s public key.  
2) The certificate holder’s identity credentials. We 
propose using the holder’s trading pseudonym and a 
photograph as their identity credentials. To do the 
verification, attestors can check the photograph against the 
appearance of party who asserts the enclosing certificate 
identifies them. One way to do the checking is by having a 
physical encounter which should be easy as traders trading 
via ad hoc networking are likely to be in close proximity 
with each other. A photograph helps defend against Sybil 
attacks and whitewashing as traders cannot easily change 
their physical appearance and it will be detectable when 
multiple identities have similar photographic appearances. 
3) The digital signature of the certificate owner. 
4) The certificate’s validity period. Each certificate will 
be issued with a standard limited validity period. Traders 
will have to generate a new self-signed certificate before the 
existing one expires and then send the newly generated 
certificate together with their current certificate to any 
forum members that they believe to be trustworthy for 
certificate verification. Certificates need to be time limited 
to some degree such as 5 years because aging changes 
physical appearance creating a mismatch with a photo.  
5) The digital signature(s) of the certificate’s attestor(s) 
and their certificate identifiers. Multiple recognised 
signatures on a single certificate give more assurance to the 
relying parties that the photograph and trading pseudonym 
in the certificate accurately identify a party with knowledge 
of the corresponding private key.  
C. The verification of digital certificates 
Since there is no inherent association between a public 
key and the identity credentials listed in the self-signed 
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digital certificates, the validity of such certificates need to 
be attested by other parties to avoid an-ill intentioned trader 
from masquerading as others. In ad hoc m-commerce 
trading systems, as participating parties are peers who 
consider each other as equals, any peer can vouch for 
another peer’s digital certificate. However, the validity of 
such a certificate will only be accepted if the relying party 
recognises a party who has vouched for the certificate as a 
trusted party. This process is based on the concept of a web-
of-trust [9-11]. For example, if peer A trusts peer B 
sufficiently as an attestor, it is expected that peer A will 
accept the validity of peer C’s digital certificate that is 
vouched by peer B. Anyone who trusts the attestor as an 
attestor, will consider any certificates signed by the attestor 
to be valid to the extent of that trust. To lessen the risk that 
any one certificate signatory is unknown or untrusted as an 
attestor, multiple signatories will usually be required. 
D. Certificate Revocation 
A certificate that has been compromised can only be 
revoked by its owner by performing the following steps: 
1) First, generate a new private-public key pair. 
2) Then, generate a new self-signed certificate that binds 
their identity credentials with the newly created public key. 
Traders are expected to use the same trading pseudonym for 
their identity credentials in order to maintain a persistent 
identity, so that their reputation can be retained. 
3) Next, send the newly-generated certificate to members 
of the trading forum prepared to attest the validity of the 
certificate. Also they need to send their old certificate with it 
in order to use the same trading pseudonym.  
4) Finally, multicast a revocation message that is signed 
by the new and old private keys together with the new and 
old certificates to other members of the forum. The 
receiving parties will update their local certificate repository 
by marking the old certificate as “compromised” and adding 
the new certificate to the list, if the signatures on the 
revocation message check out and their photos correspond. 
Otherwise the message and new certificate will be ignored. 
To assure themselves that identity credentials in a PGP 
certificate really belong to the party that presents them, a 
trader can perform the following steps upon receiving a PGP 
certificate from unfamiliar traders. Some may require 
further checks depending on the outcome of the check or 
how careful the recipient is. Some may only be important if 
the currently proposed transaction has significant downside 
risks and the receiving parties want to be assured that the 
presenting party has a good trading history. 
1) Check the trading pseudonym in the certificate against 
their store of certificates to see if a different certificate uses 
the same trading pseudonym. This step helps the recipient to 
discover attempts by an attacker to spoof the identity in that 
certificate. In this situation, the recipient should reject the 
presented identity as bogus if there is another certificate in 
his local certificate repository that use the same trading 
pseudonym yet has a photo of an obviously different person. 
2) Check the self signature against the certificate’s public 
key to ensure that the presenting party has not altered the 
contents of the certificate like the certificate’s validity 
period or its owner’s photograph. This step will protect 
against man-in-the-middle attacks. 
3) Check the photo against the appearance of the subject 
when they are in a close proximity with each other. This 
step enables the recipient to check against an attempt by the 
subject to spoof another party’s identity after discovering 
that party’s private key.  
4) Check the photo against their store of certificates to 
see if that appearance is used with a different identity. This 
enables the recipient to detect any attempt by the presenting 
party to be a whitewasher or to create multiple identities.  
5) Check that a certificate with that public key is not 
recorded as ‘compromised’ in his local certificate 
repository. This will prevent the attacker from further 
abusing a spoofed identity. It could also be used as evidence 
to exclude the presenter from a trading forum’s membership 
for conducting himself inappropriately. 
6) Check whether the certificates of any trusted third 
parties that have signed the presented certificate are 
available in his local certificate repository. They can provide 
reassurance that the presenting party with the given 
appearance is entitled to use the trading pseudonym. Any 
attempt by those third parties to attest a false identity of the 
presenting party could expose them to the risk of being 
excluded from a trading forum’s membership. This provides 
a modicum of accountability for subversive behaviour. 
7) Check that the photo appearance is not very similar to 
that of anyone that there have been broadcast warnings 
about or about whom an exclusion proposal has been issued. 
This will give some kind of assurance to the recipient that 
the certificate is not an alleged malefactor. It would also 
throw suspicion on the good faith of the signers of the 
presented certificate. 
8) Check that the validity date on the certificate has not 
expired.  An expired certificate doesn’t disprove the identity 
of its presenter but it does raise doubts about the usefulness 
of the photo and about whether the presenter has had 
difficulties finding trustable third parties to sign a current 
certificate for that party. 
To mitigate security issues related to misbehaviour of a 
trader, a distributed reputation system that employs a 
sanction-backed mechanism will be used as a means to 
facilitate trust development among traders [3]. An exclusion 
mechanism [2] that is based on collaborative decision 
making by a sufficiently large number of forum members is 
recommended for use to sanction traders that misbehave or 
have a poor reputation. This will be a strong incentive for 
traders to behave appropriately especially in fulfilling their 
transaction agreement and providing truthful deal 
evaluations and testimonials as they will be open to the risk 
of being excluded from a trading forum’s membership if 
other traders receive complaint about their misbehaviour 
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and also an exclusion proposal. A trader’s public key and a 
transaction contract that is digitally signed by both parties 
involved in the transactions, which are included in the deal 
evaluations will establish a tight binding between a trading 
party’s identity and its reputation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
With this work, we introduce a novel form of support for 
ad hoc m-commerce that aims to create a sufficient degree 
of confidence among traders to participate in such a casual 
local wireless trading, as well as to serve as a basis for 
establishing an m-commerce domain in a totally self-
organizing and P2P manner. In the design of a security and 
trust service for such trading systems, we have identified 
and discussed three main categories of threats and attacks 
that have significant affects on its security. We contend that 
by addressing these three main categories of threats and 
attacks, an environment that is sufficiently secure and 
trusted can be created for traders to communicate, 
collaborate and carry out transactions. We also contend that 
by providing robust identification support, such security 
threats and attacks can be prevented or at least mitigated.  
We have also discussed the notion of online identity in 
the context of online trading. We propose a mechanism that 
allows participating parties of an ad hoc m-commerce 
trading system to establish their online identity in a fully 
self-organizing manner using a trading pseudonym and a 
photograph as their identity credentials in a PGP certificate. 
It also allows collaboration among those parties to control 
the attestation process of such PGP certificates without 
relying on any trusted certification authority. We discussed 
the steps that can be performed by a recipient of such a PGP 
certificate in our approach to resist security attacks against 
online identity. However, as the attestation process is done 
totally in a P2P manner among traders without involving 
any higher certification authority and is based on each 
attestor’s knowledge, identity credentials presented in a 
PGP certificate that is acceptable to some parties may not be 
found acceptable to every other party in the trading forum. It 
will depend solely on the level of trust that the recipients 
have in the parties that attest the PGP certificate.  
We intend that this work together with our proposed 
group membership service [2] and a reputation system [3] 
will be able to support security for an ad hoc m-commerce 
trading system to a sufficient degree for trade to be viable 
using it. A limitation of this approach is that no 
implementation has yet been attempted to evaluate its 
effectiveness. Our future work will attempt to validate our 
proposed security and trust service with some experimental 
results using real life scenarios and security expert reviews. 
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